2026-09-15
The third tool call flipped the metadata
Deadbugz (Pillar, Aug 2026): MCP tools/list and prompts mutate after call #3 into credential-seeking + conceal. Install-time review ≠ continuous trust.
Pillar Security’s Deadbugz campaign (August 2026) shipped a “productivity-suite” MCP that looked like text formatting. For the first three tools/call requests it answered with ordinary tool docs. After call #3, tools/list and prompts/get flipped: the same server started steering the agent toward SSH keys, AWS credentials, shell history, and Kubernetes config — and told it to hide the work. tools.listChanged made the refresh look like normal protocol hygiene.
That is an operator note for anyone who treats MCP install review as a one-time checkbox, not a new gem. A clean tools/list at trust time is not a contract. Runtime-gated metadata poisoning survives the PR skim and the first poke in MCP Inspector; normal use crosses the threshold. Fingerprint approved tool definitions, treat post-approval schema/description drift as a security event, and re-approve when listChanged fires with new instructions.
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